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Abstract
We consider non-price advertising by retail rms that are privately informed as to their
respective production costs. We construct an advertising equilibrium, in which informed con-
sumers use an advertising search rule whereby they buy from the highest-advertising rm. Con-
sumers are rational in using the advertising search rule, since the lowest-cost rm advertises
the most and also selects the lowest price. Even though the advertising equilibrium facilitates
productive e¢ ciency, we establish conditions under which rms enjoy higher expected prot
when advertising is banned. Consumer welfare falls in this case, however. Under free entry,
social surplus is higher when advertising is allowed. In addition, we consider a benchmark
model of price competition; we provide comparative-statics results with respect to the number
of informed consumers, the number of rms and the distribution of costs; and we consider the
possibility of sequential search.
Bagwell: Donald L. Lucas Professor of Economics, Stanford University; Senior Fellow at SIEPR
and SCID; and NBER Research Associate. Lee: School of Economics, Singapore Management
University. We thank two anonymous referees, Yeon-Koo Che, Pauline Ippolito, Jeong-Yoo Kim,
Massimiliano Landi, Laurent Linnemer, Albert Ma and John Vickers for helpful comments. We
also thank seminar participants at EARIE, ENPC-CERAS, EUI, the Far Eastern Meeting of
the Econometric Society, Singapore Management University, and Southern Methodist University
for helpful discussions. The material in this paper was originally contained in our earlier paper
entitled Advertising and Collusion in Retail Markets, dated June 2008. The static analysis
from the earlier paper is now found here, and the dynamic analysis from the earlier paper is
now found in our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2009).
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1 Introduction
The typical retail rm sells a large number of products. When a retail rm advertises using
traditional media, such as radio, TV, billboards and magazines, the rm may thus be unable to
communicate substantial hardinformation to its potential consumers. In particular, a retail rm
that advertises using such media may be able to communicate only limited information regarding
the prices of the large range of products that it carries. Retail advertising in such media is often
thus best described as non-priceadvertising.
The prevalence of non-price advertising in retail markets raises a number of interesting questions.
First, is non-price retail advertising consistent with equilibrium behavior? Non-price advertising is
costly; thus, an advertising rm must expect that consumers respond to such advertising. Given
that the hard information embedded in such advertisements is limited or even non-existant, how-
ever, it is not obvious that advertising of this kind would elicit a positive response from rational
consumers. Second, in comparison to a setting in which non-price advertising is banned, does non-
price advertising competition raise or lower welfare in retail markets? An answer to this question is
necessary in order to evaluate the appropriate public policy toward non-price advertising. Finally,
do retail rms have an incentive to encourage regulatory restrictions on non-price advertising? An
a¢ rmative answer to this question, for example, would support the view that restrictions on retail
advertising may be a form of regulatory capture.
These questions are of particular interest in light of striking empirical relationships between
advertising and prices that have been identied in some retail industries. The classic study is by
Benham (1972). Examining transaction prices in the retail eyeglass industry in the U.S. in the
1960s, he reports that prices were higher in states that prohibited all advertising than in states
that had no restrictions on advertising; moreover, prices were only slightly higher in states that
allowed just non-price advertising than in states that also allowed price advertising. Evidently, the
ability to advertise, even if only in a non-price form, is sometimes associated with lower prices.
Cady (1976) documents similar relationships in the U.S. retail market for prescription drugs in
1970.1 At a broad level, this work raises the possibility that retail rms might gain if they were
able to limit advertising. An agreement to limit advertising is directly achieved in the presence of
a state law that prohibits advertising; alternatively, retail rms might achieve such an agreement
by forming a professional association that imposes advertising restrictions on its members.2
Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) develop a complete-information model of retail competition with
which to interpret Benhams ndings. In their model, some consumers can identify the highest-
1Related ndings are reported in other studies which focus on di¤erent retail markets, including the markets for
gasoline, routine legal services and liquor. See Bagwell (2007, Section 3.2.4) for a survey. Rizzo and Zeckhauser (1992)
consider the market for physicians and report evidence that advertising is associated with higher prices (and quality).
As they note, however, this market has several novel features: quality is di¢ cult to assess, consumers are highly
sensitive to perceived quality, and consumers are relatively insensitive to price (given third-party reimbursement).
2The FTC has argued that anti-competitive e¤ects may be associated with price and non-price advertising restric-
tions imposed by a professional association. See California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission (1999).
A further possibility is that rms interact repeatedly and achieve a self-enforcing agreement to limit advertising. We
consider this latter possibility in our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2009).
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advertising rm, while other consumers do not observe advertising levels. The former (latter) con-
sumers are referred to as informed (uninformed) consumers. Each consumer possesses a downward-
sloping demand function and lacks direct information about rmsprices: a consumer observes a
rms price only after choosing to visit that rm. Bagwell and Ramey compare two equilibria. In
a random equilibrium, consumers ignore advertising and choose rms at random. Firms do not
advertise, and they enjoy symmetric market shares. By contrast, in an advertising equilibrium, the
informed consumers go to the rm that advertises the most. Firms then use a symmetric mixed
strategy, in which higher advertising choices are paired with greater investments in cost reduction
and thus lower prices. Informed consumers are then rational in visiting the highest-advertising re-
tailer, since this retailer also o¤ers the lowest price. For a given number of rms, expected prot is
higher in the random equilibrium, because advertising expenses are thereby avoided. Bagwell and
Ramey then include an initial entry stage so as to endogenize the number of rms. Comparing free-
entry advertising and random equilibria, they show that, in the advertising equilibrium, the market
is more concentrated, prices are lower, and social welfare is higher. If the random equilibrium is
associated with a setting in which advertising is banned, these ndings are broadly consistent with
the empirical patterns that Benham reports.
In this paper, we modify the Bagwell-Ramey model by assuming that each rm has private
information about its exogenous costs of production. Specically, we consider a model with a
continuum of possible cost types, where cost types are iid across rms. We then characterize an
advertising equilibrium, in which rms use pure strategies and lower-cost rms advertise more
than do higher-cost rms. In the incomplete-information model that we analyze here, informed
consumers are rational in using the advertising search rule, since the lowest-cost rm advertises
the most and also selects the lowest price. We also compare the advertising equilibrium with the
random equilibrium in which no rm advertises, both when the number of rms is xed and when
the number of rms is endogenous, and we thereby consider the short- and long-run implications of
advertising competition for consumer surplus, rm prot and social welfare. In addition, we analyze
a benchmark model of price competition; we provide comparative-statics results with respect to the
number of informed consumers, the number of rms and the distribution of costs; and we consider
the possibility of sequential search.
At a broad level, we can interpret our model as a puriedversion of the Bagwell-Ramey model.
In fact, our analysis explores two notions of purication. Our rst notion reects the traditional
view of purication under which the mixed-strategy equilibrium of a complete-information game
can be interpreted in terms of the pure-strategy equilibrium of a nearby incomplete-information
game. In particular, for the special case in which the support of possible costs is small, we re-
port that the distribution of advertising levels in the pure-strategy advertising equilibrium of the
incomplete-information game is approximately the same as the distribution of advertising levels
in the mixed-strategy advertising equilibrium of the associated complete-information game.3 Cor-
3Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) report a similar nding when the cost of advertising is private information and varies
slightly across rms. We also note that the associated complete-information game that we consider here is closely
related to but distinct from that considered by Bagwell and Ramey; in particular, we do not allow scale economies
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respondingly, we show that the main predictions of Bagwell and Ramey directly extend to the
private-information setting, if the support of possible costs is su¢ ciently small. Under our second
notion of purication, we consider whether the main predictions are robust across equilibria for
the complete- and incomplete-information games, even when these games are not nearby to one
another. In particular, for the general case in which the support of possible cost types may be large,
we establish conditions under which the main predictions derived in the complete-information game
emerge as well in the incomplete-information game. This second notion of purication sometimes
requires additional structure on the distribution and demand functions.
We develop our results while allowing for the general case of a large support of possible cost
types. As mentioned, we establish that an advertising equilibrium exists, in which lower-cost rms
advertise more and price lower than do higher-cost rms. We then establish four additional re-
sults. First, for any given number of rms, expected consumer surplus is higher in the advertising
equilibrium than in the random equilibrium. Intuitively, in our model, the distribution of posted
prices is not a¤ected by rmsability to engage in non-price advertising; thus, uniformed consumers
are indi¤erent between the advertising and random equilibria.4 At the same time, non-price ad-
vertising enables informed consumers to locate the rm with the lowest cost and thus the lowest
price; hence, the average transaction price is lower when non-price advertising is allowed. This rst
result is consistent with Benhams observation and holds independently of any assumption about
the distribution of types or the elasticity of demand.
Second, for any given number of rms, if the distribution of types is log-concave and demand is
su¢ ciently inelastic, then rms earn higher expected prot in the random than in the advertising
equilibrium. When the number of rms is xed, therefore, rms and informed consumers rank the
advertising and random equilibria in opposite fashion. Intuitively, in comparison to the advertising
equilibrium, the random equilibrium o¤ers rms an advantage as well as a disadvantage. The
advantage of the random equilibrium is that rms avoid the expenses that are associated with
advertising competition; and the disadvantage of the random equilibrium is that it assigns the
same market share to all rms, whereas the advertising equilibrium achieves greater productive
e¢ ciency by assigning higher expected market shares to lower-cost rms. Building on techniques
used by Athey et al. (2004) in their study of price collusion, we show that the random equilibriums
advantage overwhelms its disadvantage, if the distribution of types is log-concave and demand is
su¢ ciently inelastic.5 Our second result thus gives conditions under which rms have an incentive,
at least in the short run, to seek regulatory restrictions on advertising.
The third result follows directly from the second: when the number of rms is endogenously
determined by a free-entry condition, if the distribution of types is log-concave and demand is suf-
achieved through endogenous investments in cost reduction.
4The prediction of an invariant distribution for posted prices is special to our model. It holds since we assume
that costs are exogenous and exhibit constant returns to scale.
5Athey et al. (2004) establish related conditions under which optimal collusion for sellers in a rst-price procure-
ment auction entails pooling at the buyers reservation value. See also McAfee and McMillan (1992) for a related
theory of identical bidding among collusive bidders in a rst-price auction. Our model of advertising, by contrast, is
analogous to an all-pay auction.
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ciently inelastic, more rms enter when the random equilibrium is anticipated. Thus, advertising
competition leads to a more concentrated market structure.
Finally, our fourth result concerns social welfare when the number of rms is endogenously
determined. Under free entry, rms are indi¤erent between the advertising and random equilibria,
since in each setting the number of rms adjusts until each rm earns zero prot. Whether social
surplus is higher in the advertising or random equilibrium thus hinges entirely on the consumer
surplus that is expected in each equilibrium. In fact, our rst result may be easily extended to
cover settings in which di¤erent numbers of rms enter in the advertising and random equilibria,
respectively. In particular, without making any assumption on the distribution of types or the
elasticity of demand, we show that social surplus is weakly higher in the advertising than in the
random equilibrium when the number of rms is endogenous; moreover, social surplus is strictly
higher in the advertising equilibrium if at least two rms enter in that equilibrium.
As noted, Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) also construct an advertising equilibrium, nd that rms
earn greater short-run prot in the random equilibrium, and nd that the advertising equilibrium
leads to a more concentrated market structure and greater social welfare in the long run. Our
second, third and fourth results above thus establish a sense in which Bagwell and Rameys main
predictions extend to the private-information setting. We emphasize, however, that the second and
third results now employ additional assumptions on the distribution of types and the elasticity of
demand. These additional assumptions arise because of the productive-e¢ ciency advantage that
the advertising equilibrium o¤ers in our incomplete-information setting.
We also compare the advertising equilibrium with another benchmark. In particular, we follow
Varian (1980) and suppose that informed consumers observe prices and buy from the lowest-priced
rm while uninformed consumers pick a rm at random. Following Spulber (1995) and Bagwell
and Wolinsky (2002), we modify Varians model and allow that rms are privately informed about
their production costs.6 Let us refer to the (symmetric) equilibrium of this game as the pricing
equilibrium. For any xed number of rms, we show that rms earn higher expected prot in the
pricing equilibrium than in the advertising equilibrium. This is perhaps surprising, since compe-
tition in advertising is sometimes argued to be less aggressive than competition in prices. As we
discuss, the key intuition is that price competition induces greater in-store demand from consumers
and thus elevates the size of expected information rents for rms.
With an analysis of the benchmark model in place, we are able to o¤er a more complete com-
parison across di¤erent advertising regulatory regimes. Provided that the market always has at
least two rms, our results indicate that the average transaction price is lowest in the pricing equi-
librium, somewhat higher in the advertising equilibrium, and higher yet in the random equilibrium.
Likewise, when the number of rms is endogenous, social welfare is highest in the pricing equilib-
rium, somewhat lower in the advertising equilibrium, and lower yet in the random equilibrium. If
we associate the pricing equilibrium with a setting in which price advertising is allowed, the ad-
6Bagwell and Wolinsky follow Varian and assume that each consumer possesses an inelastic demand function. We
generalize this analysis slightly and allow for downward-sloping demand functions. Spulber considers a related model
in which all consumers are informed.
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vertising equilibrium with a setting in which only non-price advertising is allowed, and the random
equilibrium with a setting in which all advertising is banned, then our results are broadly consistent
with Benhams ndings.
We next examine the comparative-statics properties of the advertising equilibrium. When
the number of informed consumers is increased, advertising increases for all types other than the
highest type. Intuitively, rms advertise more heavily when the prizefrom advertising the most
is increased.7 Interestingly, the e¤ect on advertising of an increase in the number of rms depends
on a rms cost type: lower-cost rms compete more aggressively and increase their advertising, but
higher-cost rms perceive a reduced chance of winning the informed consumers and advertise less.
An implication is that the support of observed advertising levels may be larger in markets with a
greater number of rms. We also nd that, for all types other than the lowest type, if the number
of rms is su¢ ciently large, the equilibrium level of advertising is negligible. Finally, building on
Hopkins and Korneinkos (2007) analysis of all-pay auctions, we show that, if the cost distribution
shifts to make lower-cost types more likely in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio order, then
lower-cost rms advertise more while higher-cost rms become discouraged and advertise less.8
We next modify the game to allow for sequential search. If demand is su¢ ciently inelastic
or if the cost of sequential search is su¢ ciently high, then our results are maintained without
modication. If these conditions do not hold, however, then higher-cost rms must limit price
(i.e., price below their monopoly prices), in order to deter sequential search.9 An advertising
equilibrium then continues to exist, if the support of possible cost types is not too large and
the number of informed consumers is not too great. In this equilibrium, informed consumers use
observed advertising behavior to locate the lowest price, and limit pricing by higher-cost rms
ensures that uninformed consumers do not gain from actually undertaking sequential search. We
argue as well that the possibility of sequential search may even strengthen our results, by raising
the relative protability of the random equilibrium.
Other authors have also considered the e¤ects of advertising regulations on the conduct of rms
that are privately informed as to their respective costs of production. For example, Peters (1984)
and LeBlanc (1998) consider the e¤ects of a prohibition on price advertising in models with a xed
number of rms where each rm is privately informed about its production cost. By contrast,
here we emphasize the e¤ects of a prohibition on non-price advertising, and we utilize a free-entry
condition to endogenize the number of rms. Also, Bagwell and Ramey (1994b) consider a duopoly
model in which one rm has private information as to whether its costs are high or low. For settings
in which non-price advertising is legal, they show that non-price advertising may be used to signal
low costs and thus low prices. In the current paper, by contrast, we adopt a continuum-type model,
assume that all rms are privately informed as to their costs, endogenize the number of rms using
7Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) report a related nding for their complete-information model.
8This nding contrasts interestingly with the standard monotone comparative statics result for rst-price auctions.
See, for example, Athey (2002) and Lebrun (1998).
9Our analysis here builds on Reinganum (1979) and Bagwell and Ramey (1996). Reinganum examines sequential
search in a model with privately informed rms that are not allowed to advertise. Bagwell and Ramey examine
sequential search when advertising is allowed but private information is absent.
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a free-entry condition, and report (non-monotone) comparative statics results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 denes the advertising game and contains our main
ndings. In Section 3, we present a benchmark model of price competition. Our comparative-statics
results are found in Section 4. We consider the possibility of sequential search in Section 5. Section
6 concludes. Remaining proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Advertising Game
In this section, we dene an advertising game in which a xed number of rms compete through
advertising for market share. Firms are privately informed as to their respective costs, and each
rms advertising choice may signal its costs, and thus its price, to those consumers who are informed
of advertising activities. We establish the existence of an advertising equilibrium, in which informed
consumers visit the rm with the highest level of advertising. We compare the expected prot
earned by rms in the advertising equilibrium with that which they earn in a random equilibrium,
wherein all consumers pick rms at random. We also compare expected consumer surplus in the
advertising and random equilibria. We then endogenize the number of rms and compare market
concentration and social welfare across the two equilibria.
2.1 The Model
We assume that N  2 ex ante identical rms compete for sales in a homogeneous-good market.
Each rm i is privately informed of its unit cost level i: Cost levels are iid across rms, and cost type
i is drawn from the support [; ] according to the twice-continuously di¤erentiable distribution
function, F (), where  >   0: The density f()  F 0() is positive on [; ]: As discussed in
further detail below, after rms learn their respective cost types, they simultaneously choose their
prices and levels of advertising. Following Bagwell and Ramey (1994a), we assume that advertising
is a dissipative expense that does not directly a¤ect consumer demand.
The rms face a unit mass of consumers, where each consumer possesses a twice-continuously
di¤erentiable demand function D(p) that satises D(p) > 0 > D0(p) over the relevant range of
prices p. We assume that price information cannot be directly communicated in this market; thus,
consumers cannot observe prices prior to selecting a rm to visit and from which to purchase. Some
consumers, however, do observe advertising activity prior to picking a rm. In particular, a fraction
I of consumers are informed, in the sense that they observe rmsadvertising expenses.10 Given
this information, informed consumers form beliefs as to rmscost types and determine a visitation
(search) strategy. For example, informed consumers may use an advertising search rule, whereby
a consumer goes to the rm that advertises the most.11 The remaining fraction U = 1   I are
10We assume that informed consumers observe advertising levels for simplicity. In fact, all of our results hold under
the assumption that informed consumers observe only the identity of the highest-advertising rm(s).
11 If several rms tie for the highest advertising level, then the informed consumers divide up evenly over those
rms.
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uninformed. Uninformed consumers do not observe advertising expenditures and thus may adopt
a random search rule, whereby a consumer randomly chooses which rm to visit.
The interaction between rms and consumers is represented by the following advertising game:
(i) rms learn their own cost types, (ii) rms make simultaneous choices of advertising and price,
and (iii) given any advertising information, each consumer chooses a rm to visit, observes that
rms price and makes desired purchases given this price. Note that a consumer is assumed to visit
only one rm.12 As we explain below, this assumption simplies our analysis, by ensuring that each
rm chooses the monopoly price that is associated with its cost type for any sales that it makes.
We are interested in Perfect Bayesian Equilibria for the advertising game. Before formally den-
ing our equilibrium concept, however, we impose two requirements. First, we focus on equilibria in
which consumers do not condition their visitation decisions on rmsnames.Thus, uninformed
consumers must use the random search rule; furthermore, for any given vector of advertising levels,
informed consumers must treat symmetrically any two rms which advertise at the same level. In-
formed consumers hence satisfy this restriction if they use the random or advertising search rules.13
Second, we focus on equilibria in which rms use symmetric advertising and pricing strategies. We
note that the random search rule is indeed an optimal search strategy for uninformed consumers,
when rms use symmetric pricing strategies.
Given symmetry, we can dene a pure advertising strategy for rm i as a function A(i) that
maps from the set of cost types [; ] to the set of possible advertising expenditures R+  [0;1).
Consider now rms other than rm i. Abusing notation somewhat, let A( i) denote the vector
of these rms selections when their cost types are given by the (N   1)-tuple  i. Given the
search rule used by informed consumers, the market share for rm i is determined by the vector
of advertising levels selected by rm i and its rivals. The market share for rm i thus maps from
RN+ to [0; 1] and in equilibrium may be represented as m(A(i);A( i)).14 Note that, under our
rst requirement above, rm is market share is not indexed by i and thus does not depend on
rm is name. If rm i has cost type i, its interim-stage market share under these strategies is
E i [m(A(i);A( i))]:
We next describe a rms expected prot. A rms net revenue is r(p; )  (p )D(p) (excluding
advertising expenses) when it has cost type , sets the price p and captures the entire unit mass
of consumers. We assume that r(p; ) is strictly concave in p with a unique maximizer p() =
argmaxp r(p; ): It follows that the monopoly price p() strictly increases in  whereas r(p(); )
strictly decreases in :We further assume that the price at the top has a positive margin: p() > .
Given our requirement that all consumers, and particularly uninformed consumers, treat all rms
12We extend the analysis to allow for sequential search in Section 5.
13Under the random search rule, consumers randomly pick a rm from the set of all rms. Similarly, under the
advertising search rule, informed consumers randomize over all rms that advertise at the highest level (if more than
one such rm exists).
14For example, if all consumers use the random search rule, then m(A(i);A( i)) = 1=N . If instead the unin-
formed consumers use the random search rule while the informed consumers use the advertising search rule, then
m(A(i);A( i)) = I+U=N if A(i) > A(j) for all j 6= i, while m(A(i);A( i)) = U=N if A(i) < A(j) for some
j 6= i. For this latter set of consumer search strategies, if rm i ties with k  1 other rms for the highest advertising
level, then m(A(i);A( i)) = I=k + U=N .
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symmetrically, we know that all rms receive positive expected market share. Therefore, in the
equilibria upon which we focus, each rm must select the monopoly price given its cost type.
Embedding the monopoly price into the revenue function, we may dene the interim-stage net
revenue for rm i by R(A(i); i;A)  r(p(i); i)E i [m(A(i);A( i))]. Thus, R(A(i); i;A)
is the interim-stage net revenue for rm i when rm i has cost type i, advertises at level A(i),
and anticipates that other rms also use the advertising function A to determine their respective
advertising levels upon observing their cost types. Firm is expected revenue is EiR(Ai(i); i;A);
and rm is expected prot is thus Ei [R(A(i); i;A) A(i)].
Given our embedded requirements, we may now dene an equilibrium as an advertising strategy
A, a belief function and search rules for consumers that collectively satisfy three remaining condi-
tions. First, given the market share function, m, that is induced by consumerssearch rules, the
advertising strategy A is such that, for all i and i; A(i) 2 argmaxai [R(ai; i;A)  ai].15 Second,
given an observed advertising level ai by rm i, informed consumers use BayesRule whenever
possible (i.e., whenever ai = A(i) for some i 2 [; ]) in forming their beliefs as to rm i0s cost
type i and thus price p(i). Third, for any observed vector of advertising levels [a1; :::; aN ] 2 RN+ ,
given their beliefs, the informed consumerssearch rule directs them to the rm or rms with the
lowest expected price.
We may now simplify our notation for equilibrium variables somewhat further. In particular, we
may dene rm is interim-stage market share asM(A(i);A)  E i [m(A(i);A( i))] : Similarly,
we can dene rm is interim-stage prot and net revenue as follows:
(A(i); i;A)  r(p(i); i)M(A(i);A) A(i):
 R(A(i); i;A) A(i):
We note that the interim-stage prot function satises a single-crossing property: higher types
are less willing to engage in higher advertising to increase expected market share.16 For here and
later use, we now write interim-stage prot in direct-form notation, ignoring subscript i: if a rm
of type  picks an advertising level A(b) when its rivals employ the strategy A; then we dene
(b; ;A)  (A(b); ;A); M(b;A) M(A(b);A) and R(b; ;A)  R(A(b); ;A):
We are primarily interested in two kinds of equilibria. In an advertising equilibrium, informed
consumers use the advertising search rule. Since p() is strictly increasing, such equilibria can exist
only if the advertising schedule A is nonincreasing, so that higher-advertising rms have lower costs
and thus o¤er lower prices. In a random equilibrium, informed consumers ignore advertising and
use the random search rule. A random equilibrium thus can exist only if rms maximize expected
prots and do not advertise (i.e., A  0):
15Notice that A(i) must be an optimal choice for rm i with cost type i in comparison to advertising deviations
that are on-schedule(i.e., ai such that ai = A() 6= A(i) for some  2 [; ]) as well as o¤-schedule(i.e., ai such
that ai 6= A() for any  2 [; ]).
16When a rm increases its advertising level, it may confront a trade o¤ between the larger advertising expense,
ai, and the consequent higher expected market share, M(ai;A): When the interim-stage prot is held constant, the
slope dai=dM(ai;A) is given by r(p(i); i); which is strictly decreasing in i:
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2.2 Advertising Equilibrium
In an advertising equilibrium, informed consumers use the advertising search rule while uninformed
consumers are randomly distributed across all N rms. We now report the following existence and
uniqueness result.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique advertising equilibrium, and in this equilibrium A() is
strictly decreasing and di¤erentiable and satises A() = 0.
Proof. We rst derive the necessary features of an advertising equilibrium. The following
incentive constraints are necessary: For any  2 [; ] and any b 2 [; ],
r(p(b);b)M(b;A) A(b)  r(p(b);b)M(;A) A()
r(p(); )M(;A) A()  r(p(); )M(b;A) A(b):
Adding yields [r(p(b);b)  r(p(); )][M(b;A) M(;A)]  0: Since r(p(); ) is strictly decreasing
in ; it is thus necessary thatM(;A) is nonincreasing. It thus follows from the incentive constraints
that A() is nonincreasing. Further, given the advertising search rule, it is clear that A() cannot be
constant over any interval of types: by increasing its advertising an innitesimal amount, a rm with
a type on this interval would experience a discrete gain in its expected market share. Thus, A()
must be strictly decreasing, and consequently it is necessary that M(;A) = UN + [1  F ()]N 1I:
It thus follows that M(;A) = UN . A rm with type  thus cannot be deterred from selecting zero
advertising, and hence A() = 0 is also necessary.
We next establish that A() must be di¤erentiable, and we also derive the necessary expression
for A0(): Consider any b < : Rearranging the incentive constraints presented above, we nd that
r(p(); )[M(b;A) M(;A)]b     A(b) A()b     r(p(b);b)[M(b;A) M(;A)]b    :
Similarly, consider any b > . The incentive constraints may now be rearranged to yield
r(p(); )[M(b;A) M(;A)]b     A(b) A()b     r(p(b);b)[M(b;A) M(;A)]b    :
Allowing that b may approach  from the right or the left, we may now take limits as b ! ; use
the di¤erentiability of the function M(;A) = UN + [1  F ()]N 1I, and conclude that
A0() = r(p(); )
@M(;A)
@
:
When combined with the boundary condition A() = 0; this di¤erential equation may be solved to
yield
A() =  
Z 

r(p(x); x)[@M(x;A)=@x]dx;
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where @M(x;A)@x =  (N   1)[1  F (x)]N 2f(x)I < 0 for all x < :
We now integrate by parts and establish that A() must take the following unique form:
A() = R(; ;A) R(; ;A) 
Z 

D(p(x))

U
N
+ [1  F (x)]N 1I

dx; (1)
where R(; ;A) = r(p(); )UN : Rearranging, we note that interim-stage prot for type  then must
be given as
(; ;A) = R(; ;A) +
Z 

D(p(x))

U
N
+ [1  F (x)]N 1I

dx: (2)
Observe that interim-stage prot is positive for all  2 [; ]:
The second step in our proof is to construct an advertising equilibrium using the A() function
dened in (1). Observe that 1(; ;A) = r(p(); )
@M(;A)
@  A0() = 0 when this function is used.
It follows that no type  will deviate by mimicking some other type b, since for all b <  we have
(; ;A) (b; ;A) = Z b 1(x; ;A)dx
=
Z 
b [1(x; ;A) 1(x; x;A)] dx
=
Z 
b
Z 
x
12(x; y;A)dydx > 0;
where the inequality follows from 12(x; y;A) = D(p(y))(N   1)[1   F (x)]N 2f(x)I > 0 for all
x < : A similar argument ensures that (; ;A) > (b; ;A) for all b > : Next, if no type  > 
gains from deviating to A(), then a deviation to any advertising level a > A() is also unattractive.
Finally, since A0() < 0; the advertising search rule is optimal for informed consumers. 
Proposition 1 thus establishes the existence and uniqueness of an advertising equilibrium.17
The advertising equilibrium acts as a fully sorting (separating) mechanism: rms truthfully reveal
their cost types along the downward-sloping advertising schedule. The informed consumers behave
rationally in the advertising model: the lowest-cost rm advertises the most and o¤ers the lowest
price, and the informed consumers purchase from the highest-advertising rm. Thus, ostensibly
uninformative advertising directs market share to the lowest-cost supplier and promotes productive
e¢ ciency.
We now characterize the expected prot for rms in the advertising equilibrium. Using (2) and
integrating by parts, we nd that expected prot may be represented as:
E [(; ;A)] = r(p(); )
U
N
+ E

D(p())
F
f
()

U
N
+ [1  F ()]N 1I

: (3)
17See Maskin and Riley (1984) for a related equilibrium characterization of bidding functions in the context of
optimal auctions when buyers are risk averse. Our model also endogenizes the beliefs and strategies of informed
consumers. For an advertising equilibrium, beliefs are uniquely dened on the equilibrium path (by Bayesrule) and
o¤ the equilibrium path (since the advertising search rule is optimal for informed consumers when they observe an
advertising level in excess of A() only if they believe that the deviating rm has cost type ).
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The rst term on the RHS is the prot at the top.The fully sorting scheme allocates the lowest
market share for the type at the top: the probability of winning the informed consumers is zero for
the highest type, . The second term represents the expected information rents. In regard to the
magnitude of the second term, the fully sorting scheme has both a strength and a weakness. To see
this, consider how the market share allocation a¤ects the magnitude of the term. The strength of
the fully sorting scheme is based on downward-sloping demand. Lower-cost rms set lower prices
and thus generate greater demand from visiting consumers; hence, by directing more market share
to lower-cost rms, the fully sorting scheme acts to expand the size of the market and increase
expected information rents. The weakness of the fully sorting scheme is associated with the term
F
f (): When greater market share is directed to type , this type earns greater prot and is thus
less tempted to mimic lower types. Lower types can then also earn greater prot without inducing
a violation of incentive compatibility. Intuitively, the ratio Ff () then describes the contribution
to expected prot that is made when type  receives greater market share, since this measures the
proportion of types below  conditional on the occurrence of type . Suppose that F is log-concave
(Ff () is nondecreasing in ).
18 Then an increase in market share to type  contributes more to
expected prot when type  is higher. The fully sorting scheme minimizes the market share that is
allocated to higher types and thus works against the direction to which log-concavity of F appeals.
The advertising equilibrium can be understood as a purication of Bagwell and Ramey (1994a).
In their paper, advertising directs market share to the rm that o¤ers the best deals, but equilibrium
advertising takes the form of a mixed strategy. To see how our model constructs a puried version,
consider a complete-information game, where production costs are xed at a constant c > 0: Then,
as we establish in the Appendix, there exists a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in
this game as in Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) and Varian (1980).19 Consider next an incomplete-
information game, where production costs rise in types : As we show in the Appendix, if a rm of
type  uses the advertising strategy A() in the unique advertising equilibrium of the incomplete-
information game, then the probability distribution induced by A is approximately the same as the
distribution of advertising in the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the complete-information game,
when the production costs for types  (say, c()) approximate the constant c: This purication
result o¤ers a useful link between the complete- and incomplete-information analyses; however,
it does not establish whether the main predictions of Bagwell and Ramey carry over when, as
seems plausible, production costs vary signicantly with types. As we show below, when some
additional structure is placed on the demand and distribution functions, the main predictions of
the complete-information model can be captured in the general incomplete-information setting.
18This assumption is common in the contract literature and is satised by many distribution functions.
19 In the complete-information game considered here, all rms set the same price and informed consumers are
indi¤erent when using the advertising search rule. By contrast, Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) allow rms to make
cost-reducing investments, and this ensures that higher-advertising rms o¤er strictly lower prices. In the analysis of
advertising equilibria considered here, the advertising search rule is strictly optimal for informed consumers provided
that incomplete information is present so that production costs vary (at least a little) with types.
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2.3 Random Equilibrium
In this subsection, we analyze the random equilibrium, wherein all consumers use the random search
rule and thus divide up evenly across rms. Each rm then receives an equal share, 1N , of the unit
mass of consumers. Given the random search rule, rms necessarily choose zero advertising, since
even informed consumers are unresponsive to advertising; furthermore, when rms pool and do not
advertise, the random search rule is a best response for each consumer.20 The random equilibrium
thus exists and takes the form of a pooling equilibrium.
In the random equilibrium, the interim-stage prot for the rm of type  is given by r(p(); ) 1N :
The random equilibrium sacrices productive e¢ ciency; however, all advertising expenses are
avoided. Using dr(p();)d =  D(p()); it is straightforward to conrm that the expected prot
for a rm in the random equilibrium is
E

r(p(); )
1
N

= r(p(); )
1
N
+ E

D(p())
F
f
()
1
N

: (4)
The RHS contains the prot at the top and the expected information rents, respectively.
2.4 Comparison of Advertising and Random Equilibria
We now compare the advertising and random equilibria. We begin by comparing the expected
consumer surplus in these equilibria. An uniformed consumer expects the same consumer surplus
whether the advertising or random equilibrium is anticipated. For both equilibria, the uninformed
consumers samples from the induced distribution of monopoly prices and expects to pay E [p()].
By contrast, an informed consumer expects strictly higher consumer surplus in the advertising equi-
librium than in the random equilibrium. The key point is that, in the advertising equilibrium, an
informed consumer can infer the identity of the lowest-cost, and thus lowest-price, rm. Accordingly,
while the distribution of prices is not altered across equilibria, the informed consumer in the adver-
tising equilibrium transacts at the lowest available price. Formally, an informed consumer expects
to pay E [p()] in the random equilibrium and E[p(min)], where min  minf1; :::; Ng, in the
advertising equilibrium. Under our assumption that N  2, we have that E[p(min)] < E [p()].
The comparison of expected prot across equilibria is more subtle. As illustrated in (3) and
(4), in both types of equilibria, expected prot consists of two terms: the prot at the top and the
expected information rents. To increase the prot at the top, the random equilibrium (pooling)
is strictly preferred to the advertising equilibrium (full sorting). Intuitively, the highest-cost rm
20 If informed consumers observe a deviation whereby some rm selects positive advertising, then random search
remains optimal in the event that informed consumers believe that the deviating rm has an average type. Since such
a deviation may be more attractive to a lower-cost type, the random equilibrium may fail to be a renedequilibrium
in the static model. See Bagwell and Ramey (1994b) for an analysis of the rened equilibrium in a related model
of advertising in which one rm has two possible cost types. As noted in the Introduction, the random equilibrium
can also be associated with a setting in which advertising is prohibited (in which case deviant positive advertising
selections are not possible). Our analysis here of random equilibria is also useful for our companion paper (Bagwell
and Lee, 2009), where we consider the repeated game and the possibility of a self-enforcing agreement among rms
in which a deviation from zero advertising would cause a future advertising war.
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is never out-advertised in the random equilibrium and thus sells to its share of all consumers,
1
N ; by contrast, in the advertising equilibrium, the highest-cost rm is always out-advertised and
thus sells only to its share of uninformed consumers, UN . To increase expected information rents,
however, it is not immediately clear whether the random or advertising equilibrium is preferred.
On the one hand, if Ff () is nondecreasing, then the random equilibrium is attractive, since this
equilibrium allocates more market share to higher-cost types. On the other hand, downward-sloping
demand creates a force that favors the advertising equilibrium, which allocates more market share
to lower-cost types, since these types price lower and thus generate larger demand D(p()):
For the special case in which the support of possible cost types is small, we can unambiguously
rank expected prots under the advertising and random equilibria. In particular, as   approaches
zero, expected information rents also approach zero in both the advertising and random equilibria.
Prot at the top remains strictly higher under the random equilibrium, however, since the highest-
cost rm gets strictly more market share in the random than the advertising equilibrium. Thus, for
   su¢ ciently small, expected prot is strictly higher under the random equilibrium than under
the advertising equilibrium. Given the purication result described above and established in the
Appendix, this nding can be understood as a direct extension of Bagwell and Rameys (1994a)
analogous nding for the associated complete-information game.
Consider next the general case in which the support of possible costs may be large. To go
further in ranking expected prots, we must formally analyze the expected information rents.21
Let A denote the advertising schedule used in the advertising equilibrium, in which the market
share allocation, M(;A) = UN + [1   F ()]N 1I; is strictly decreasing. Similarly, let Ap  0
denote the advertising schedule used in the random (pooling) equilibrium, in which the market
share allocation, M(;Ap)  1N ; is constant. We now dene the distribution function
G(;A) 
R 
 M(x;A)f(x)dxR 
 M(x;A)f(x)dx
:
The distribution G(;Ap) is similarly dened. The denominator represents the (ex ante) ex-
pected market share, which equals 1N : Since M(;A) is strictly decreasing, M(;A
p) = 1N crosses
M(;A) from below: This implies in turn that G(;Ap) rst-order stochastically dominates G(;A):
G(;Ap)  G(;A): Thus, if D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing, thenZ 

D(p())
F
f
()dG (;Ap) 
Z 

D(p())
F
f
()dG (;A) :
The inequality can be rewritten as
E

D(p())
F
f
()M(;Ap)

 E

D(p())
F
f
()M(;A)

: (5)
21Our analysis here builds on arguments made by Athey et al. (2004) in their analysis of price collusion.
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Referring to (3)-(5), we conclude that, if D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing, then expected information
rents are weakly higher in the random equilibrium than in the advertising equilibrium. In fact, given
our assumption that f() > 0, we can go further and establish that, ifD(p())Ff () is nondecreasing,
then the random equilibrium must generate strictly higher information rents than the advertising
equilibrium. This follows since D(p())Ff () is strictly increasing at , given f() > 0:
Summarizing, in comparison to the advertising equilibrium, the random equilibrium has strictly
higher prot at the top and, if D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing, strictly higher expected information
rents. As suggested above, D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing if the log-concavity of F is signicant in
comparison to the extent to which demand slopes down. Further insight is possible by considering
the limiting case in which D(p()) is perfectly inelastic, so that D(p()) is constant for all prices
up to a reservation value. In this case, if F () is log-concave, then D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing.
We may now state the following conclusion:
Proposition 2. (i) Informed consumers enjoy strictly higher expected consumer surplus in the
advertising equilibrium than in the random equilibrium, and uninformed consumers enjoy exactly
the same expected consumer surplus in both equilibria. (ii) If F is log-concave and demand is
su¢ ciently inelastic, or if the support of possible cost types is su¢ ciently small, then rms make a
strictly higher expected prot in the random equilibrium than in the advertising equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (i) captures the implications of advertising restrictions for consumer welfare.
While the ability to advertise does not a¤ect the distribution of posted prices, it does lead to a strict
reduction in the average transaction price. This nding is consistent with Benhams observations.
We discuss this point further in the next subsection, when we allow for endogenous entry.
Proposition 2 (ii) indicates that important circumstances exist under which rms gain when the
use of advertising is restricted. As our discussion of the random equilibrium conrms, advertising
would not be used if informed consumers were to ignore it. If informed consumers were responsive
to advertising, however, then rms might nevertheless achieve a restriction on the use of advertising
if advertising were legally prohibited. For a xed industry structure, Proposition 2 (ii) thus suggests
that retail rms might benet from a prohibition on non-price retail advertising.22
Proposition 2 (ii) establishes that rms gain by restricting the use of advertising if F is log-
concave and demand is su¢ ciently inelastic or if the support of possible cost types is su¢ ciently
small.23 It is important to note, though, that this conclusion may hold even when the assumptions
are weakened. Consider the constant-elasticity demand function, D(p) = p ; and suppose that
demand is elastic (i.e.,  > 1): Assume further that F is log-concave in the specic sense that
22A further possibility is that rms are able to eliminate the use of advertising through a self-enforcing collusive
agreement and that rms prefer such a restriction to any other self-enforcing advertising scheme. We consider this
possibility in our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2009).
23Under these conditions, rms prefer the random equilibrium to the advertising equilibrium, because separation
through advertising is too costly as a means of informing consumers of rmscost types. Information transmission
itself would be valuable to rms if it could be achieved at lower cost. For example, rms would earn even higher
expected prot if they could costlessly and veriably tell informed consumers the identity of the lowest-cost rm,
since rms would then enjoy productive e¢ ciency without incurring any advertising expenditures. See Ziv (1993) for
an analysis of a similar issue in the context of oligopoly information sharing.
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types are distributed uniformly over [; ] where  > 0: For this example, calculations reveal that
d
d [D(p())
F
f ()] > 0 for all  if =[   ] > : Firms thus earn a strictly higher expected prot
by pooling at zero advertising than by following the advertising equilibrium, provided that the
elasticity of demand, ; does not exceed a critical level where this level is higher when the support
of possible cost types is smaller.
2.5 Free-Entry Equilibrium
We now relax the assumption that the number of rms is xed. To this end, following Bagwell and
Ramey (1994a), we include now an initial stage for the game in which rms simultaneously decide
whether to enter, where entry entails a positive setup (or opportunity) cost. After a rm chooses
to enter, it privately learns its cost type. The number of entering rms is publicly observed, and
the game then proceeds as above.
It is clear from (3) and (4) that expected prot is strictly decreasing in the number of rms, N;
whether rms anticipate the advertising or random equilibrium. Thus, in each case, an equilibrium
number of rms is implied such that the prot from entry (inclusive of the xed cost) would be
negative were one more rm to enter. Let N s denote the equilibrium number of entering rms
when the advertising (full sorting) equilibrium is anticipated, and let Np denote the equilibrium
number of entering rms when the random (pooling) equilibrium is expected. It is also clear from
Proposition 2 that, if F is log-concave and demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, or if    is su¢ ciently
small, then Np  N s: Under these conditions, at least as many rms enter when the random
equilibrium is expected as when the advertising equilibrium is anticipated.
The model also leads to welfare comparisons. Assume that min(N s; Np)  1:24 When the
number of rms is endogenized, if we ignore integer constraints, then rms earn zero expected
prot whether the random or advertising equilibrium is anticipated. Uninformed consumers are
also indi¤erent. Under either equilibrium, an uninformed consumer picks a rm at random and thus
faces an expected price of Ep(): Finally, consider the informed consumers. When the random
equilibrium occurs, an informed consumer also faces an expected price of Ep(); however, when
the advertising equilibrium occurs, an informed consumer is guided by advertising activity to the
lowest market price and thus faces the expected minimum price in the market. Provided that
N s  2; an informed consumer thus strictly prefers the advertising equilibrium. When the number
of rms is endogenous, it follows that expected welfare is higher when the advertising equilibrium
is anticipated than when the random equilibrium is expected. This conclusion does not require any
assumption as to the elasticity of demand or the log-concavity of the distribution function.
We may now summarize with the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Assume that min(N s; Np)  1. (i) If F is log-concave and demand is su¢ ciently
inelastic, or if the support of possible cost types is su¢ ciently small, then Np  N s (concentration
is at least as high in the advertising equilibrium as in the random equilibrium). (ii) Social surplus
24When N = 1; a single rm enters the market and chooses A = 0; and all consumers visit it.
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is as high in the advertising equilibrium as in the random equilibrium; further, if N s  2; then
social surplus is strictly higher in the advertising equilibrium than in the random equilibrium.
Allowing that the support of possible costs may be large, we thus establish a sense in which
Bagwell and Rameys main ndings extend to the private-information setting. When legal or other
considerations lead to the absence of advertising, if the distribution of types is log-concave and
demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, then the market is less concentrated than it would be were ad-
vertising competition to occur. Furthermore, the average transaction price is lower, and social
welfare is thus higher, when entry is endogenized and rms compete in advertising. Note, however,
that some ndings such as Proposition 2 (ii) and Proposition 3 (i) are not straightforward, given
downward-sloping demand. For a given number of rms, pooling at zero advertising acts to increase
the prot at the top but sorting through advertising acts to increase expected information rents
when demand is substantially larger for lower prices. This conict suggests that market concentra-
tion could be lower in the advertising equilibrium than in the random equilibrium, when demand
is su¢ ciently elastic. Thus, the established positive association between advertising and market
concentration employs additional assumptions on the distribution of types and the elasticity of
demand in the general private-information setting.
It is interesting to compare these ndings with empirical patterns emphasized in the earlier
literature on advertising. Benham (1972) provides evidence for retail markets that prices are lower
and market concentration is higher, when non-price retail advertising is allowed. Our ndings
o¤er theoretical support for these associations. In another set of studies, Bain (1956), Comanor
and Wilson (1974) and others nd a positive relationship between manufacturer advertising and
protability. These authors suggest that the relationship may reect the role of advertising in
deterring entry. Consistent with interpretations o¤ered by Demsetz (1973) and Nelson (1974),
our work suggests that advertising and protability may be positively related, since they are both
implications of superior e¢ ciency. In particular, in the advertising equilibrium, lower-cost rms
advertise more, have larger sales and earn greater expected prot.25
3 Comparison with Pricing Equilibrium
In this section, we compare the advertising equilibrium with the analogous pricing equilibrium
that emerges in a benchmark model in which N  2 ex ante identical rms compete in prices.
In particular, we follow Varian (1980) and suppose that informed consumers observe prices and
buy from the lowest-priced rm while uninformed consumers pick a rm at random. Following
Spulber (1995) and Bagwell and Wolinsky (2002), we modify Varians model and allow that rms
are privately informed as to their costs. We characterize the pricing equilibrium of this benchmark
25While (interim) expected prot is decreasing in cost, ex post prot need not decrease in cost. In particular, for
U su¢ ciently small and  < , ex post prot increases in cost among those rms that do not have the lowest cost in
the market. This is because such losingrms make few sales when U is small and incur lower advertising expenses
when costs are higher. Thus, in some circumstances, higher ex post prot may be paired with lower advertising for
a subset of rms. We thank a referee for this observation. Note that, under our assumption that demand is not
perfectly inelastic, sales decrease with cost even in an ex post sense, because higher-cost rms select higher prices.
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game and compare the associated expected prot with that achieved in the advertising equilibrium
of our advertising game.
In the benchmark game, if a pricing strategy is denoted by ; then the interim-stage prot in
direct form is given by
B(b; ; ) = [(b)  ]D((b))MB(b; );
where we use the superscript B to denote the benchmark (Bertrand) game. When a rm selects
the price (b) and other rms use the pricing strategy ; then the rms expected market share is
denoted as MB(b; ): The prot-if-win is dened by [(b)   ]D((b))  r((b); ): As in Spulber
(1995), a unique and symmetric equilibrium can be established. A new feature in our benchmark
model is that uninformed consumers exist. The pricing equilibrium  satises:
0() =  r((); )[@M
B(; )=@]
r((); )MB (; )
and () = p(); (6)
where MB(; ) = UN + [1   F ()]N 1I. Straightforward arguments ensure that the equilibrium
price is lower than the monopoly price except the price at the top, so that r > 0: As (6) conrms,
the equilibrium pricing schedule is strictly increasing; thus, rms are fully sorted by their types in
the pricing equilibrium. Notice that the highest-cost rm selects its monopoly price, p(); and sells
only to uninformed consumers.
In the pricing equilibrium, interim-stage prot can be written as
B(; ; ) = B(; ; ) +
Z 

D((x))

U
N
+ [1  F (x)]N 1I

dx; (7)
where the prot at the top is B(; ; ) = r(p(); )UN : Integrating by parts, we nd that expected
prot is given as:
E

B(; ; )

= r(p(); )
U
N
+ E

D(())
F
f
()

U
N
+ [1  F ()]N 1I

: (8)
Comparing (8) with (3), we see that the prot at the top is the same in the advertising equilib-
rium as in the pricing equilibrium. In each case, the highest-cost rm monopolizes only uninformed
consumers. The expected information rents are higher in the pricing equilibrium, however, since de-
mand is greater when prices are set below monopoly levels. We thus have the following conclusion:
for any xed number of rms, a rms expected prot is strictly higher in the pricing equilibrium
than in the advertising equilibrium.26 Evidently, when rms possess private information about
their costs, competition in (non-price) advertising is more aggressive than (Bertrand) competition
in prices. Intuitively, price competition induces greater in-store demand from consumers and thus
elevates the size of expected information rents for rms. When the number of rms is xed, both
26 In a di¤erent context, Bagwell and Ramey (1988) present a somewhat related nding. Working with a two-type
signaling model, they show that a low-cost incumbent earns greater prot when it separates using price as a signal
than when it separates using wasteful advertising (money-burning) as a signal.
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consumers and rms agree that the pricing equilibrium is preferred to the advertising equilibrium.
When the number of rms is endogenized by the free-entry condition, more rms enter in the for-
mer equilibrium than in the latter equilibrium. Once market structure is endogenized, rms are
indi¤erent between pricing and advertising competition, but consumers strictly prefer the former
to the latter (provided that at least two rms enter in the pricing equilibrium).
We may thus summarize the ndings of this section as follows:
Proposition 4. There exists a unique and symmetric pricing equilibrium, and in this equilibrium
the pricing function () satises () >  and is strictly increasing and di¤erentiable. Expected
prot and consumer surplus are both strictly higher in the pricing equilibrium than in the advertising
equilibrium. Further, when the number of rms is endogenized, at least as many rms enter in the
pricing equilibrium as in the advertising equilibrium; and, if at least two rms enter in the pricing
equilibrium, then social surplus is strictly higher in the pricing equilibrium than in the advertising
equilibrium.
With these ndings at hand, we may now o¤er a further interpretation of Benhams ndings.
Let us associate the advertising equilibrium with a setting in which only non-price advertising is
allowed, the pricing equilibrium with a setting in which price advertising is allowed, and the random
equilibrium with a setting in which advertising is banned.27 Provided that the market always has
at least two rms, our results in this section indicate that the average transaction price is lowest
when price advertising is allowed, somewhat higher when only non-price advertising is allowed,
and higher yet when all advertising is banned. Likewise, when the number of rms is endogenous,
social welfare is highest when price advertising is allowed, somewhat lower when only non-price
advertising is allowed, and lower yet when all advertising is banned. Finally, when demand is
su¢ ciently inelastic and the distribution of types is log-concave, the market is less concentrated
when advertising is banned than when non-price or price advertising is allowed.28 These ndings
are broadly consistent with Benhams ndings.
4 Comparative Statics
We now return to the advertising model and conduct comparative-statics analysis. In particular,
we consider how the advertising equilibrium responds to changes in the parameters, I and N; and
to shifts of the distribution function of types.
To analyze comparative statics associated with distribution functions, we consider distribution
27Our association of the pricing equilibrium with a setting in which price advertising is allowed implicitly assumes
that price advertising is not costly and that rms do not choose the intensity of price advertising. It would be
interesting to explore as well a model of price advertising that relaxes these assumptions. We leave this to future
research.
28For a xed number of rms, if demand is perfectly inelastic, the expected information rents in the pricing
equilibrium are the same as in the advertising equilibrium. Thus, when demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, market
concentration is approximately the same in these two equilibria. Further, if   is su¢ ciently small, then the market
is less concentrated when advertising is banned than when non-price or price advertising is allowed. This is because
the random equilibrium generates the largest market share for a rm with cost type .
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functions F and G that have the same support [; ]: As above, the distribution functions are twice-
continuously di¤erentiable and have positive densities f and g:We then compare two advertising
equilibrium strategies, AF () and AG(); that correspond to the distribution functions, F and
G; respectively. We compare the distributions F and G by using the monotone likelihood ratio
(MLR) order: The distribution function F dominates G in terms of the MLR order if f()g() is strictly
increasing for all  2 [; ]. Using the MLR order, we can show how rms choose their advertising
when lower-cost (higher-advertising) types are more likely under G than under F:
Our comparative-statics results are contained in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. (i) Equilibrium advertising A() is strictly increasing in I for all  <  with
A() = 0: (ii) If N rises, then there exists b 2 (; F 1(1 e  1N 1 )) such that equilibrium advertising
strictly increases for  2 [;b), strictly decreases for  2 (b; ), and is unchanged for  2 fb; g:
(iii) For all  >  and " > 0, there exists N 0 such that, for all N > N 0, A() < ". (iv) If
distribution function F dominates G in terms of the MLR order, then there exists e 2 (; ) such
that AF () < AG() for  2 [;e); AF () > AG() for  2 (e; ), and AF () = AG() for  2 fe; g.
The proofs of parts (ii) and (iv) are in the Appendix.
Using the derivation of A() in the proof of Proposition 1, we can immediately conrm that
part (i) holds.29 Intuitively, rms compete more intensely by raising advertising when the gain
from capturing informed consumers rises. It is less clear, however, whether advertising increases
when N rises. On the one hand, an increase in the number of rms may lead to greater competition
for the informed consumers and thus an increase in advertising. On the other hand, an increase in
the number of rms may also cause rms to become discouraged about the prospect of winning the
informed consumers and thus result in a decrease in advertising. In part (ii), we conrm that these
competing considerations weigh di¤erently across rms with di¤erent cost types: when the number
of rms increases, lower-cost rms compete more aggressively and raise advertising, while higher-
cost rms perceive a reduced chance of winning the informed consumers and lower advertising. An
interesting implication is that the support of equilibrium advertising levels (i.e., [A() = 0; A()]) is
larger in markets with more rms. Observe, however, that as the number of rms goes to innity,
the cuto¤ type b converges to ; thus, for markets with a su¢ ciently large number of rms, further
entry is almost sure to lower the advertising of any given rm. In fact, we can easily conrm that
part (iii) holds and thus that, for any type other than the lowest type, the equilibrium level of
advertising must be near zero when the number of rms is su¢ ciently large.30
Finally, as part (iv) establishes, competing considerations arise as well when the distribution
of costs changes so that lower-cost realizations become more likely in the sense of the MLR order.
Following such a shift, lower-cost rms compete more aggressively for informed consumers and thus
increase their advertising; however, higher-cost rms become discouraged about their chances of
winning the informed consumers and thus lower their advertising levels. Our work here builds on
29Formally, this follows since @M(x;A)=@x is strictly decreasing in I for all x < .
30As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, A() = 0 and A0() = r(p(); )@M(;A)=@. Part (iii) thus follows,
since, for all  > , @M(;A)=@ goes to zero as N goes to innity.
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Hopkins and Kornienko (2007), who report a similar nding for a family of all-pay auctions.
5 Sequential Search
In the advertising model considered above, we assume that consumers are unable to engage in
sequential search. We now examine equilibrium behavior when this assumption is relaxed. Thus,
we allow that after a consumer visits a rm and observes that rms price, the consumer may elect
to incur a search cost and visit another rm.
Consider then a modied advertising game, in which consumers can undertake costly sequential
search and rms choose advertising levels and prices. A Symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
may be informally dened in terms of the following requirements: (i) each rm selects its advertising
level and price to maximize its expected prot, given its type and the strategies of other players; (ii)
each consumer selects an initial rm to visit and any subsequent rm to visit in a way that maximizes
the consumers expected welfare at each point, given the information that the consumer then has
and the consumers beliefs about prices at rms not yet visited; (iii) where possible, consumers
beliefs are formed in a manner consistent with Bayes rule, given the equilibrium strategies of
rms;31 and (iv) rms use symmetric price and advertising strategies. An advertising equilibrium
is a Symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which informed consumers pick an initial rm using
the advertising search rule while uninformed consumers pick an initial rm at random. A random
equilibrium is a Symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which all consumers ignore advertising
and select an initial rm at random.
We begin by observing that the sequential-search option is irrelevant if the cost of sequential
search is su¢ ciently large relative to the expected dispersion of prices in the market. Suppose
that rms follow the advertising equilibrium of the original advertising game as characterized in
Proposition 1. An uninformed consumer is then most tempted to search again in the event that the
consumer encounters the highest possible monopoly price, p(): Let U(p) denote consumer surplus
at the price p; and let the cost of sequential search be denoted as d > 0.32 Even a consumer
that encounters p() wont gain from sequential search, if U(p())  EU(p())   d. Thus, if
p()   Ep() is small relative to the cost of sequential search, then an uninformed consumer
never gains from sequential search. This condition is sure to hold in the limiting case of perfectly
inelastic demand, since then the monopoly price is independent of production costs. Likewise,
for the constant-elasticity demand function, D(p) = p ; with elasticity  > 1, we have that
p() Ep() =  1 [  E]. Thus, if the extent of dispersion in production costs is small relative
to the size of the sequential-search cost, then uniformed consumers will not search again even after
encountering the highest monopoly price.
31The concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium also includes a no-signaling-what-you-dont-know requirement. In
the present context, this means that, if a consumer initially visits rm i and contemplates undertaking the sequential
search cost and visiting some other rm j, then the consumers belief about the price that might be observed at rm
j is not altered by the price observed at rm i. Of course, for an informed consumer, the belief about the price at
rm j may be inuenced by the advertising level selected by rm j:
32For simplicity, we assume that the initial search has zero cost.
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If instead the cost of sequential search is small relative to the expected dispersion of prices,
then higher-cost rms induce search if they select their monopoly prices. To capture this situation,
we assume henceforth that U(p()) < EU(p())   d: Building on work by Reinganum (1979)
and Bagwell and Ramey (1996), our goal is to establish conditions under which an advertising
equilibrium exists in which rms with cost types at or above a critical level c 2 (; ) select the
monopoly price for this critical type. In particular, we seek to construct an advertising equilibrium
in which a rm with cost type  > c prices at p(c) < p(), where p(c) is determined so that the
costs and benets of sequential search are equal. Higher-cost rms then limit priceand thereby
deter uninformed consumers from searching again.
In our proposed advertising equilibrium, a rm of cost type  thus selects the price p() 
minfp(); p(c)g and earns the corresponding net revenue r(p(); ): We now impose a new as-
sumption that p() > : This assumption is sure to hold if the dispersion in cost types is not too
great or if demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, and it ensures that p(c) >  so that r(p(); ) remains
strictly positive even for the highest type. Observe also that r(p(); ) is strictly decreasing with
dr(p();)
d =  D(p()) < 0: With these properties in place, we can conrm that the arguments
used in the proof of Proposition 1 continue to hold when rms use the pricing function p(): Thus,
the level of advertising again strictly declines as costs increase, and no rm of any type gains from
undertaking an on-schedule deviation and mimicking the advertising level of some other type.
Informed consumers are again rational in visiting the rm with the highest advertising level, since
this rm selects the lowest price in the market.33 Two issues remain. First, we must establish that a
critical value c 2 (; ) indeed exists such that an uninformed consumer is indi¤erent to sequential
search upon observing p(c): Second, we must establish that no rm with cost type  > c would
gain from undertaking an o¤-scheduledeviation to a higher price.
Consider the rst issue. Under our assumption that U(p()) < EU(p())  d, it is straightfor-
ward to establish that there exists a unique value c 2 (; ) such that
U(p(c)) = [1  F (c)]U(p(c)) +
Z c

U(p())dF ()  d: (9)
The LHS of (9) represents the consumer welfare from remaining with a rm that selects p(c); while
the RHS represents the expected welfare from incurring the sequential-search cost d and nding
the same price or a lower price. The critical value c 2 (; ) is then determined so as to make
the consumer indi¤erent between the two options: Notice that c is independent of the fraction of
informed consumers, I, and is strictly increasing in the sequential-search cost, d. As d gets close to
zero, c gets close to  and thus almost all types select the limit price.
To understand the second issue, consider a rm with cost type  > c: This rm retains
its uninformed consumers if it sets the limit price, p(c); and loses its uninformed consumers if
it sets any higher price. Under our assumption that p() > ; we know that the rm earns
33Note, though, that informed consumers are indi¤erent about using the advertising search rule in the event that
all rms draw cost types at or above c:
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strictly positive net revenue on its uninformed consumers at the price p(c): Thus, as regards its
uninformed consumers, the rm earns strictly more by selecting the price p(c) than it would make
by undertaking an o¤-schedule deviation to any higher price. But this rm must also consider
informed consumers. With probability [1 F ()]N 1, this rm advertises more than all other rms
and receives the informed consumers. In this event, as in the model analyzed by Bagwell and Ramey
(1996), the informed consumers observe all advertising choices and thus know that all other rms
have higher costs and thus select the price p(c): The informed consumers will then tolerate a price
hike without searching again, provided that the hike is not too large. The maximal price hike that
informed consumers will tolerate is h(d) where h(d) is dened by U(p(c) + h(d))  U(p(c))  d:
It follows that the optimal o¤-schedule deviation for a rm of type  > c is the price p(; c; d) 
minfp(); p(c) + h(d)g; where c is determined as a function of d by (9).
We may now conclude that a rm with cost type  > c does not gain from an o¤-schedule
deviation to a higher price if

(; c; d)  [(1  F ())N 1I][r(p(; c; d); )  r(p(c); )]  U
N
r(p(c); )  0: (10)
The rst term on the RHS of (10) captures the possible benet of a price hike in terms of more
protable sales to informed consumers whereas the second term reects the certain cost of a price
hike in terms of lost sales to uninformed consumers. Notice that 
(c; c; d) < 0, since p(c; c; d) =
p(c). Likewise, 
(; c; d) < 0 follows, since the highest-cost rm wins the informed consumers
with probability zero and earns strictly positive net revenue at the price p(c) under our assumption
that p() > : Outside of these boundary cases, we cannot immediately sign 
(; c; d): We can,
however, state the following su¢ cient condition: There exists I 2 (0; 1) such that if I < I then
for all  2 (c; ); 
(; c; d) < 0. In other words, if the fraction of informed consumers is not too
great, then no type of rm will undertake an o¤-schedule deviation by raising price.
We may now summarize our ndings as follows.
Proposition 6. Consider the advertising game, modied to allow for sequential search. Assume
that the search cost satises U(p()) < EU(p())   d and that p() > : There exists I 2 (0; 1)
such that if I < I then an advertising equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, (i) rms use an
advertising strategy A() that is strictly decreasing and di¤erentiable and satises A() = 0; (ii)
rms use the pricing strategy p(); where c 2 (; ) satises (9); and (iii) consumers do not
engage in sequential search along the equilibrium path.
In e¤ect, Proposition 6 establishes conditions under which Proposition 1 extends to the setting in
which sequential search is possible and not prohibitively expensive.34
We now consider the e¤ect of sequential search on the comparison between expected prots
under the random and advertising equilibria. When sequential search is possible, our assumption
that p() >  ensures that a random equilibrium exists, wherein rms use the modied pricing
34The advertising equilibrium of the modied static game is also unique, if the denitions of the advertising and
random search rules are extended to cover sequential search decisions. Otherwise, some uninformed consumers that
encounter the price p(c) may undertake sequential search out of indi¤erence, for example.
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schedule, p():35 As this assumption implies that prot at the top is strictly positive, the random
equilibrium again generates strictly greater prot at the top than does the constructed advertising
equilibrium (when it exists). When sequential search is prohibited, expected information rents are
strictly higher under the random than advertising equilibrium if Ff ()D(p()) is nondecreasing.
Likewise, when sequential search is possible, expected information rents are strictly higher under
the random than advertising equilibrium if Ff ()D(p
()) is nondecreasing. Since p() is constant
in  for  > c; log-concavity of F alone now ensures that Ff ()D(p
()) is nondecreasing when
 > c: Thus, the tension between log-concavity and reduced demand is removed for higher types
when sequential search is possible. In this respect, the possibility of sequential search serves to
strengthen our basic result that rms achieve higher expected prot when they restrict the use of
advertising.36
6 Conclusion
We investigate the advertising behavior of rms with private information as to their respective costs.
We show that an advertising equilibrium exists, in which informed consumers use an advertising
search rule whereby they buy from the highest-advertising rm. The key point is that the highest-
advertising rm has the lowest cost and thus selects the lowest price. In this way, non-informative
advertising directs consumers to the lowest price in the market. We establish conditions under which
rms earn greater expected prot when advertising is banned. Consumer welfare falls in this case,
however. Thus, advertising can promote product e¢ ciency and raise consumer welfare; however,
rms often have incentive to diminish advertising competition through regulatory restrictions.
We also consider three extensions of the model. First, we present a benchmark model in which
privately informed rms compete in prices for informed consumers, and we argue that the associ-
ated pricing equilibrium generates greater prot and consumer welfare than does the advertising
equilibrium. Second, we show that the advertising equilibrium exhibits non-monotone comparative
statics: when the number of rms increases, or when the lower-cost rms become more likely in
the sense of the monotone-likelihood ratio, lower-cost rms advertise more while higher-cost rms
become discouraged and advertise less. Third, we modify the advertising model to allow for se-
quential search, and we establish conditions under which an advertising equilibrium continues to
exist in the modied model.
We close by mentioning one example of a further extension that represents a promising direction
for future research. In our model, advertising expenses are incurred prior to the realization of
sales, and so rms implictly rely on retained earnings or external capital markets when incurring
advertising expenditures. Further, if the number of uninformed consumers is small, then it is
35The existence of the random equilibrium does not require any additional assumption on the fraction of informed
consumers, since rms do not advertise in the random equilibrium and thus all consumers are, in e¤ect, uninformed.
Thus, the random equilibrium is the counterpart of the equilibrium featured by Reinganum (1979).
36Note, though, that sequential search lowers prot at the top, since higher-cost rms earn lower prot when
sequential search is possible. Sequential search thus diminishes the magnitude of the prot-at-the-top advantage that
the random equilibrium has in comparison to the advertising equilibrium.
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possible that a rm may not make su¢ cient prot to cover its advertising expenditure in the current
period. These considerations provide motivation for a model in which each rms advertising
expenditure is capped at some common level. Gavious, Moldavanu and Sela (2002) consider a
related contest model. Their results suggest the possibility of an advertising equilibrium in which
the advertising function is discontinuous, intermediate types advertise more when a cap is in place,
and all but the highest types advertise at the capped level and thus pool. Interesting future work
might build on this analysis, in order to consider the e¤ects of an advertising cap on expected
advertising expenditures and social welfare.
7 Appendix
This appendix has two parts. In support of the discussion at the end of Section 2.2, the rst
part denes a complete-information game, characterizes the associated symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium, and shows that the distribution of advertising in this equilibrium is approximately
the same as that which is induced by the pure-strategy advertising equilibrium of the incomplete-
information game when production costs vary su¢ ciently little with respect to types. The second
part completes the proof of Proposition 5.
7.1 Purication
7.1.1 Equilibrium in Complete-Information Game
Suppose that N rms sell a homogeneous good at a constant cost c > 0: A pure strategy for rm i
is Ai 2 [0; r(p(c); c)] and A i denotes the (N   1)-tuple of advertising selected by other rms. The
prot for rm i is
i(Ai; A i) =
8><>:
r(p(c); c)UN  Ai if Ai < maxj 6=iAj
r(p(c); c)

U
N +
I
k
 Ai if Ai  maxj 6=iAj andkfj j Aj = Aigk = k   1:
The term r(p(c); c) represents [p(c) c]D(p(c)): A mixed strategy for rm i is a distribution function
 over [A(); A()]: The prot for rm i is
Ei(i; i) =
Z A
A
  
Z A
A
(Ai; A i)d1    dN ;
where A and A are dened below. This complete-information game has a unique symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium,  = i for all i; which is characterized as follows:
Lemma A1. (i) There is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. (ii) There is a unique symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium:
(A) =

A
r(p(c); c)I
 1
N 1
with A() = 0 and A() = r(p(c); c)I: (A1)
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Proof. To prove (i), assume that there are k rms that select the highest advertising A: First,
suppose that 2  k  N: If A < r(p(c); c)I; then a rm can gain by raising A slightly by " and
winning all the informed consumers:
r(p(c); c)

U
N
+ I

 A  " > r(p(c); c)

U
N
+
I
k

 A:
If A = r(p(c); c)I; then a rm can increase its prot by reducing A to zero and winning only the
uninformed consumers:
r(p(c); c)
U
N
> r(p(c); c)

U
N
+
I
k

 A:
Second, suppose that k = 1: The highest-advertising rm can raise its prot by setting A  " which
is slightly above the second-highest advertising.
To prove (ii), we begin by showing that any symmetric Nash equilibrium, ; must satisfy (A1).
To this end, we establish four ndings. First, there is no mass point in : If A is a mass point of
; then there is a positive probability of tie at A: A rm can increase its prot, if it preserves the
hypothesized equilibrium strategy, except that it replaces the selection of A with the selection of
A+ " for small ": Second, A() = 0: Suppose that A() > 0: If a rm chooses A(); then it wins
only the uninformed consumers with probability one, since ties occur with zero probability (because
of no mass point). The rm can increase its prot when it replaces the selection of [A(); A()+"]
with the selection of zero advertising. Third, A() = r(p(c); c)I: This result is immediate, since
the prot at the top is equal to the prot at the bottom in the mixed-strategy equilibrium:
r(p(c); c)

U
N
+ I

 A() = r(p(c); c)U
N
:
Fourth,  is strictly increasing over (A(); A()): Suppose that there is a gap (A1; A2) such that
A() < A1 < A2 < A() and (A1) = (A2): Advertisements in the interval (A1; A2) are then
selected with zero probability. For " small, a rm would gain by replacing the selection of advertising
levels in the interval [A2; A2+"] with the selection of A1+": This deviation has the same probability
of winning but uses a lower level of advertising. Given these four ndings, we may conclude that,
in any symmetric Nash equilibrium, ; and for all A 2 [0; r(p(c); c)I];
r(p(c); c)

U
N
+ [(A)]N 1I

 A = r(p(c); c)U
N
: (A2)
This equation yields (A1). Thus, (A1) is necessarily satised in a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Observe next that (A1) identies a well-dened and unique distribution function (A): Lastly, we
verify that  is a Nash equilibrium. A rm earns the same expected prot for any A 2 [A(); A()]
when all other N 1 rms adopt (A): It cannot increase the prot by altering the distribution over
the interval. Any advertising above A() earns a lower expected prot than does A(); because
A() wins the informed consumers with probability one. Any advertising below A() is infeasible.

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7.1.2 Equilibrium in Incomplete-Information Game
We consider an incomplete-information game, where production costs rise in types :We argue that
if each rm of type  chooses A(); which is the unique advertising equilibrium in the incomplete-
information game, then the probability distribution induced by A is approximately the distribution
of advertising in the mixed-strategy equilibrium, when the payo¤ relevance of types  gets small.
In the incomplete-information game, the rm of type  2 [; ] privately observes its type and has
the cost c(): Assume that function c is di¤erentiable and strictly increasing in ; with 0 < c() <
c() < pR; where pR is given by D(pR) = 0: The advertising game is the same as in the text. Then,
arguing as in the proof of Proposition 1, there is a unique advertising equilibrium A which satises:
A0() =  r(p(); )(N   1)[1  F ()]N 2f()I < 0 and A() = 0; (A3)
where r(p(); ) = [p(c())  c()]D(p(c())):
Lemma A2. Given a constant c 2 (0; pR); for any " > 0; there exists  > 0 such that if
jc()  cj <  for all  2 [; ]; then the probability distribution of advertising induced by the adver-
tising equilibrium in the incomplete-information game is "-close to c; where c is the distribution
of advertising in the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the complete-information game with constant cost
c:
Proof. The distribution induced by A() is
prob ( j A()  x) = prob    A 1(x) = 1  F  A 1(x) :
Let c denote the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium with costs c: Dene the function Ac by
Ac() = 
 1
c (()); where ()  1  F ():
Given that () is strictly decreasing in  and c is strictly increasing, Ac() is strictly decreasing
in : The proof is established as a consequence of the following results. First, if each rm of type 
chooses Ac(); then the distribution of advertising becomes c: In other words, Ac() induces the
same distribution of advertising as c:
prob (Ac()  x) = prob
 
 1c (())  x

= prob (()  c(x))
= prob (F ()  1  c(x))
= prob
 
  F 1(1  c(x))

= 1  F  F 1(1  c(x))
= c(x):
Second, Ac() solves (A3) when c() = c: By the denition of Ac(); we have that
A0c() =  f()=0c(Ac()):
To nd 0c(Ac()); we recall the mixed strategy (A2) and di¤erentiate it with respect to A :
26
1 = (N   1)r(p(c); c) [(A)]N 20(A)I:
Replacing  with c; we obtain
0c(A) =
1
(N   1)r(p(c); c) [c(A)]N 2 I
:
Substituting, we thus nd that
A0c() =  (N   1)r(p(c); c) [c(Ac())]N 2 f()I:
Note also that Ac() =  1c (1   F ()) =  1(0) = 0: Hence, when c() = c; Ac() solves (A3).
Third, if jc()  cj is small, then A() induces approximately the same distribution of advertising
as does c: This result is based on the rst and second result. The function Ac() induces c by
the rst result, and Ac() approximates A() when c() approaches c by the second result: for any
" > 0; there exists  > 0 such that if jc()  cj <  for all  2 [; ]; then jA() Ac()j < ": As c()
becomes closer to a constant c; the type  becomes less payo¤-relevant. Hence, the distribution
of advertising induced by A(); prob( j A()  x) ; approximates c when the payo¤ relevance of
types  gets small. 
7.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider part (ii). Note rst that advertising at the top is held xed at A() = A0() = 0 for all
N: Di¤erentiating jA0 ()j with respect to N yields:
@ jA0 ()j
@N
=
A0() 1 + (N   1) ln[1  F ()]
N   1

:
The equation means that for a slight increase of N; A() becomes atter over the types above
F 1(1  e  1N 1 ) 2 (; ) and steeper over the types below F 1(1  e  1N 1 ):We can next show that
advertising at the bottom, A(); strictly increases when N rises. To see this, integrating by parts,
we get
A() =
Z 

r(p(x); x)(N   1)[1  F (x)]N 2f(x)Idx
= r(p(); )I  
Z 

[1  F (x)]N 1D(p(x))Idx:
The integral on the RHS strictly decreases with N and thus A() strictly increases in N: Hence,
we can now conclude that there exists a cuto¤ type b < F 1(1   e  1N 1 ) such that equilibrium
advertising strictly increases with N for  2 [;b), strictly decreases with N for  2 (b; ), and is
constant with N when  2 fb; g.
Consider part (iv). For the proof, we proceed with four steps as follows. First, we establish a
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monotonicity in the ratio of advertising equilibrium slopes under MLR dominance. Dene
()  A
0
F ()
A0G()
=
f()
g()

1  F ()
1 G()
N 2
:
For  2 [; ), the ratio () of two slopes is strictly increasing in ; since f()g() and 1 F ()1 G() are
then positive and strictly increasing under MLR dominance. The latter term, 1 F ()1 G() ; is strictly
increasing if 1 F ()f() >
1 G()
g() : To see that this inequality holds for  2 [; ), note that MLR
dominance can be re-stated as f(y)f(x) >
g(y)
g(x) for all y > x; hence, for x 2 [; ), MLR dominance
implies
R 
x
f(y)
f(x)dy >
R 
x
g(y)
g(x)dy and thus
1 F (x)
f(x) >
1 G(x)
g(x) : Second, we establish that AF () < AG():
Note that
AF () AG() =  
Z 

 
[1  F (x)]N 1   [1 G(x)]N 1D(p(x))Idx:
We thus have that AF () < AG() if
1 F ()
1 G() > 1 for all  > . This inequality holds, since
1 F ()
1 G() achieves its minimum value of 1 at  and (as established above) is strictly increasing for
 2 [; ) under MLR dominance: Third, we show that () = f()g() < 1 < [f()g() ]N 1 = (). The
stated properties for () follow immediately from the denition of () and MLR dominance,
while the stated properties for () follow from using LHopitals rule and MLR dominance. Given
AF () < AG(), AF () = AG() = 0 and () > 1, we can conclude that there exists e 2 (; )
at which AG() crosses AF () from above. Fourth, we establish that a second interior crossing
does not exist. Assume to the contrary that there exists 2 2 (; ) at which AG() crosses AF ()
from below and thus (2) > 1. Given AF () = AG() = 0 and () > 1, there must then exist
3 2 (2; ) at which AG() crosses AF () from above and thus (3) < 1. But this contradicts our
rst result that () is strictly increasing in  over  2 [; ) under MLR dominance.
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